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THE AUTHORITY OF LAW IN THE PREDICAMENT
OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY
JOHN FINNIS*
Legal theory is only a part of social theory. The shape of
a methodologically critical social theory is determined by
moral and political theory.' The effort of moral and political
theory is to discern principles for solving practical problems
of behavior and distribution in human community - princi-
ples that are reasonable (fair, efficiently beneficial. . .), and
preferable or even best. The effort of legal theory, when spe-
cifically focused, is different. It is to explain why, and on what
conditions, principles and solutions once settled upon are to
be given effect even when there is no consensus that the set-
tlement was or is still correct, or that correct principles for
arriving at such solutions were followed or are even available.
Because legal theory must assume that those subject to
the law disagree about what the content of particular laws
should be, it must walk a narrow path, from which many le-
gal theorists stray. On the one side, legal theory must not ig-
nore the lack of consensus about solutions to practical
problems. On the other side, it must not assume that there
really are no correct principles for solving practical problems;
or that one can do legal theory well without having a correct
moral and political theory; or that the correct principles con-
form to the model of techniques in themselves amoral and
sub-political, such as cooking, bridge-building, or competitive
games.
This article explores one of the central enterprises of le-
gal theory: the explanation and justification, in principle, of
the law's moral authority. Part I shows how one influential
contemporary rejection of that authority rests on an unwar-
ranted assumption of social consensus. Part II has much
wider horizons. It surveys, partly historically and partly sys-
* LL.B. (Adelaide, South Australia), 1962; D.Phil. (Oxford), 1965.
Rhodes Reader in the Laws of the British Commonwealth and the United
States of America, in the University of Oxford; Stowell Civil Law Fellow
and Praelector in Jurisprudence, University College, Oxford.
1. For the dependence of even purely descriptive social theory on an
implicit or explicit ethics and political theory, see J. FiNNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (1980).
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tematically (though not, of course, exhaustively), some main
aspects of the predicament of contemporary social theories as
they struggle to make do with emaciated conceptions of practical
reasonableness. The critique of these struggles hints at richer
conceptions which I have recently expounded and defended
more fully.' Finally, Part III resumes the problem of legal
authority, to show how legal theory can and should appeal to
a full conception of fairness to explain why a law can be judg-
ed morally binding even by those who reasonably regard it as
unwise.
In the seventies, legal theorists began to argue that law,
even good law, creates no moral reason to obey it just be-
cause it is law." There is, they have argued, no generic moral
obligation, not even prima facie or presumptive or defeasible,
to obey the law. And this contention about obligation is
equally a contention about authority. For to show that sub-
jects have some moral obligation to obey the law is, by entail-
ment, to show that the law has moral authority. 4
2. See J. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 59-197; J. FINNis, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ETHICS (1983). These works argue that being practically reasonable is one
of the basic opportunities or basic human goods or basic aspects of human
flourishing, along with other basic goods such as bodily life, knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, friendship. . .. They further argue that practi-
cal reasonableness involves a number of basic requirements, structuring the
pursuit of all the basic human goods; requirements such as call for a coher-
ent plan of life, detachment, commitment, no arbitrary preferences
amongst basic goods, no arbitrary discrimination amongst persons, atten-
tion to consequences and efficiency, no attack on any basic human good in
any act. . . . This footnote, of course, gives only hints of that account; the
text below, without attempting to repeat or even summarize the books, in-
troduces some of these conceptions in a way that is, I hope, sufficiently self-
explanatory.
3. See, Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82
YALE L.J. 950 (1973); J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233-49 (1979); Sarto-
rius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. REv. 3 (1982).
4. It is possible to conceive of a form of moral authority of rulers
which does not entail any moral obligation of their subjects to comply with
the rules; Rolf Sartorius contends that this form of moral authority is not
merely conceivable but is actually worth considering: Sartorius, supra note
3. But he does not deny that any generic moral obligation to obey the law
entails that the law and its authors have moral authority. He fails to show
that arguments capable of justifying a claim to moral authority to make
and enforce the law would not equally (or by addition of only uncontrover-
sial premises) justify the claim that there is a generic moral obligation to
obey that law. Since this is not disputed by Joseph Raz, I will treat the
questions of authority and obligation without further differentiation. On
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I offer here no point-by-point refutation of the argu-
ments of these theorists.' Instead, I identify one structural
weakness in their case. Reflection on this weakness will bring
to light the materials needed to construct a positive case af-
firming the moral obligation to obey the law.
The weakness comes to light when we observe how Jo-
seph Raz's influential denial of the law's moral authority'
goes along with two ungrudging admissions: that everyone
has moral reason to cooperate in securing certain social goals,
and that law is instrumental in securing those goals. These
admissions expose Raz's case to an obvious objection: what is
instrumental in securing a morally obligatory goal must itself
be morally obligatory, unless there is some other instrumen-
tality, equally or more serviceable. Raz responds unsuccess-
fully to that objection, and the failure of his response clarifies
the way in which law serves the goods attainable by
cooperation.
Raz begins by granting that law indeed has, as one of its
two principal functions, the role of securing morally desirable
cooperation. As he points out, schemes of social cooperation
are of various kinds. One of the most typical and pervasive
schemes concerns acts which are useful if a sufficiently large
number of people behave in appropriate ways but are with-
out any value if nobody does or if only few people do. Pollut-
ing the rivers is an example. If a sufficiently large number of
people refrain from polluting the rivers, they will be clean,
and each person has a moral reason to contribute to keeping
them clean.7 The law, continues Raz, is indeed
instrumental in setting up and maintaining schemes of so-
cial cooperation, and this not only by providing sanctions to
motivate those who would not otherwise contribute their
shares... but also through designating in an open and
public way what the scheme is and what each has to do as
his contribution to it. . ., thus enabling those who are moti-
vated by the appropriate reasons to take part in the cooper-
the tight interrelationship between the concepts of authority and obliga-
tion, see J. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 233-34, 255, 314-20, 335-37, 345;
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 253-59 (1982).
5. For a brief refutation of M.B.E. Smith's central argument (supra
note 3) see J. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 345.
6. J. RAz, supra note 3, at 233: "there is no [moral] obligation to
obey the law even in a good society whose legal system is just."
7. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 247-48. Note that by "a moral reason
to. . .", Raz means a moral obligation. See id. at 12, 235-36, 248.
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ative enterprise.6
But, he concludes, the fact that law thus "enables" us to do
what we have moral reason to do does not create for us a
moral reason to comply with the law. For, he says,
the moral reasons affecting such cases derive entirely from
the factual existence of the social practice of cooperation
and not at all from the fact that the law is instrumental in its
institution or maintenance. Consider the example of river
pollution mentioned above. It matters not at all to one's
moral reasoning whether the practice of keeping the rivers
clean is sanctioned by law, is maintained by exhortations
and propaganda undertaken by enthusiastic individuals, or
whether it grew up entirely spontaneously.'
In short, the moral authority of the scheme of cooperation
derives entirely from the practice of cooperation and not at
all from the fact that the practice is legally stipulated. The
goal, cooperation, is morally obligatory, but the law is not
necessary for attaining it; other available means will do.
In affirming that law has moral authority, one is contra-
dicting Raz's claim that it "matters not at all to one's moral
reasoning" whether a scheme of social cooperation is sanc-
tioned by law, or maintained merely by the alternative means
of exhortations and propaganda or spontaneous social prac-
tices. And the ground for contradicting Raz's claim is essen-
tially that human good is complex, and conceptions of human
goods are even more so. To speak to the case discussed by
Raz: the benefit of having clean rivers neither is, nor is uni-
versally regarded as, the only relevant good.
It is perfectly possible for farmers or manufacturers on
the banks of the river to judge that there is no sufficient rea-
son for a national policy of eliminating river pollution. Such a
view may equally be held by persons with no special personal
interest, concerned only for the well-being of the national
economy. They may rest their view on the heavy economic
costs of the anti-pollution policy: the cost of compensating ri-
parian owners, and the cost of providing alternative means of
waste disposal, at a time of economic stringency in export in-
dustries competing with foreigners unhampered by anti-pol-
lution laws. And so forth.
Confronted with an anti-pollution propaganda campaign,
8. Id. at 248-49.
9. Id. at 249 (emphases added).
[Vol. I
AUTHORITY OF LAW
whether by pressure groups or even by Government, the
farmer or manufacturer has, therefore, no sufficient reason
to comply. He may well think the policy misguided; and it
will damage him personally while yielding him nothing which
he counts a significant benefit. Similarly, with a practice of
not polluting rivers, the farmer has no reason to treat the
incipient or prevailing trend as morally compelling. For, once
again, he may well think the practice misguided; and, again
his own immediate interests also suggest that he have no part
in it.
But if and when a law is passed, things are changed for
the farmer's practical reasoning. Now he can reason thus: "I
should comply with this law, even though this law is neither
in the national interest nor in my own. I should comply be-
cause I get many benefits from 'the law', from the legal sys-
tem within which I live. My farm is protected from damage;
my sales of farm produce are enforceable against the pur-
chaser for the purchase price; those prices are supported by a
government policy based on the laws of taxation and of mar-
ket regulation; and so forth. Getting these benefits from the
law, I should accept its burdens. Even though I might be able
to 'benefit' even more by my secret non-compliance, I want
to be a fair and upright citizen, just as I want others to be fair
and upright in their dealings with me, whether they be my
employees, fellow tradesmen, bankers and insurers, or the lo-
cal police and courts. Moreover, I think the votes of elected
representatives a useful and fair method of resolving national
issues; in this instance my view has not prevailed in that polit-
ical process; but sometimes the favor is in the majority, and
when that happens I expect the law to be obeyed; so I should
go along with it when I'm on the losing side in the vote."
Still, it may be asked, why does the law, and not the
propaganda campaign or the spontaneous social practice, get
the benefit of these considerations of fairness? An answer
must begin by pointing to the wide range of benefits which the
subject derives from others' compliance with law. This partic-
ular law, just because it is the law, lays on him the burden of
avoiding river-polluting methods of farming or manufactur-
ing. But the law (not this particular law, but the same "law of
the land"), just as law, enforces against his neighbors the obli-
gation not to burn down his buildings, and not to build new
premises in defiance of zoning regulations, and the obligation
to pay the purchase price of goods bought from him. Equally,
the law, just as law, imposes on countless other people the
obligation to pay the taxes which make possible a farm price
19841
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support policy rather beneficial to the farmer.
The law presents itself as a seamless web. Its subjects are
not permitted to pick and choose among the law's prescrip-
tions and stipulations. It links together, in a privileged way,
all the persons, and all the transactions, bearing on the
farmer's present and immediate future situation. It also links
all the people and transactions which have borne on the
farmer's well-being or interests in the past. And finally, it
links too all the people and transactions that may bear on his
future interests and well-being as he moves into other occu-
pations, into retirement, old-age, illness and death. The met-
aphors, "web" and "links", here stand for the fact that in all
,these differing times and situations, a common reason for ac-
tion - the law - was available and peremptory.1
Not all aspects of the common good are identified and
protected or advanced, even purportedly, by the law. Not all
the requirements of fairness or of appropriate community-
mindedness are brought into play by the law's requirements.
But to trace out the seamless web of the law is to gain a sin-
gularly adequate view of the breadth and complexity of the
common good, of fairness, and of what may be involved in an
appropriate philia politike ("friendship within the polity",
good neighborliness towards the whole of society)."
The law has a further significance. Apart from the law,
the farmer could reasonably be relatively indifferent to the
concerns and interests of persons whose activities, apart from
the law, do not affect him or at least do not benefit him. To
take only the most obvious example, the farmer could, apart
from the law, be indifferent to the concerns and interests of
all the environment-conscious enthusiasts who campaign for
anti-pollution laws. But when the law forbids pollution, he
cannot but recognize that those who pressed on him this bur-
den are themselves subject to burdens which, while they have
no intrinsic relation to his burden, do share with him the
quality of being peremptory and imposed for the supposed
common good of this same community.
These, then, are some reasons for denying Raz's claim
that "it matters not at all to one's moral reasoning whether
the practice of keeping rivers clean is sanctioned by law [or]
10. On the notion of peremptory reasons for action, see J. R.Az, supra
note 3, at 235; H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 261; cf J. FINNIS, supra note
1, at 234.
11. On philia politik, see 3 E. VOEGELIN, ORDER AND HISTORY, (PLATO
AND ARISTOTLE) 320-21 (1957).
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is maintained by enthusiastic pressure groups."' These rea-
sons do not yet adequately express the case for affirming that
such a law is morally authoritative. I return to that case in
Part III. But first I explore some of the main reasons why
contemporary legal theories lack, or distort, the conceptual
materials needed for making out that case.
II
Legal theory gets off to a shaky start with the Platonic
discussion in the Minos."3 Socrates is shown making two
moves. The right move is the explanation of legal authority
and obligation in terms of what is needed for securing human
good. The wrong move (presented by the author as right) is
to treat the hoped-for human good, the end, as if it were a
producible, that can be made and completed like the omelet
that can be made by following a recipe, or the bridge that
can be built by following a blue-print. In this conception, the
end is external to the process required to produce it; the
processes have only instrumental value. Practical reasonable-
ness, individual or political, is conceived in emaciated fashion
as a craft, only more extensive in its ambition and perhaps
more demanding in its skills than other crafts.""
Western social theory has frequently reverted to some
such emaciated conception of practical reasonableness. Aris-
totle teetered on the brink of instrumentalizing all human
practical reasonableness and virtue to the attaining of oppor-
tunity for contemplation.'5 Aquinas often spoke in similar
fashion,'6 but in act makes the essential corrective move.
There is, he says,' 7 not one first principle of practical reason-
ing, rather there are many, all equally fundamental and
equally substantive. Thus, there is no determinate one natu-
12. J. RAZ, supra, note 3, at 249. I should make it clear that Raz's
own social theory is scarcely open to the charge of employing an emaciated
concept of practical reason.
13. PLATO (OR PSEUDO-PLATO), MINOS 316e-317a (R. Hathaway, trans.
in 14 AM.J. Jutis. 116, 120).
14. On the craft analogy in the early works of Plato, see T. IRWIN,
PLATO's MORAL THEORY: THE EARLY AND MIDDLE DIALOGUES 71-86, 90-10 1,
109, 127-31, 174-81, 196-97 (1977).
15. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, Book X.7: 1177a12-1178a9.
16. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Prima Secundae, q.3, a.6c; q.5 7 , a.l
ad 2; q.66, a.4 ad 1.
17. Id., Prima Seeundae, q.58, a.4c; q.63, a.lc; q.94, aa.2c, 3c, 4c;
Secunda Secundae, q.47, a.6c & ad 1 & ad 3. For a brief exposition of these
texts, see J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 68-69.
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ral last end or determinate unifying purpose of individual or
social life. But Aquinas's texts were sufficiently Aristotelian to
be widely misread; many, thinking to follow him, treated con-
templation of theoretical truth as a determinate natural last
end, and avoided instrumentalizing moral life only by declar-
ing that the first principles of which Aquinas spoke are not
human goods to be done and pursued, but negative moral
principles in the same logical form as the Ten Command-
ments. 8 Others instrumentalized the human virtues to the
pursuit of a supernatural end conceived simply as a vision of
God.' This simplified account had two unfortunate conse-
quences. The point of the virtues, and even of ordinary good
actions, was made obscure (for how do they tend to fit one for
a future contemplative vision?). And the lives of those who
did indeed stand in the way of the divine project were liable
to be treated instrumentally in the fashion of mere obstacles.
The theological inadequacy of such conceptions of
human good was recently explained by the Second Vatican
Council, which identifies the ultimate end of mankind, not
simply as a vision of truth, nor even as a participation in holi-
ness and grace, but as a participation by a multiplicity of per-
sons in a manifold of goods. The goods are specified, in out-
line, as: human dignity, brotherhood and freedom and thus
"all the good fruits of our nature and of our effort." The
envisaged participation in these goods is called "a kingdom of
truth and life, holiness and grace, justice, love and peace."
On this account, ordinary good deeds and virtues of every
kind can go to building up here and now that supernatural
kingdom. And when that kingdom is hereafter completed,
there "will be found again", as intrinsic to its heavenly consti-
tution and life, those good works and virtues themselves
(which thus are revealed to faith to have more than merely
instrumental value).20
While Aquinas affirmed the plurality of basic and intrin-
18. See, e.g., V. BOURKE, ETHICS (3d ed. 1966). For the historical back-
ground in Cajetan, Medina, Suarez and other theologians of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, see H. DE LUBAC, THE MYSTERY OF THE SUPER-
NATURAL, 25-67, 181-201 (1977). A brief and penetrating survey is Grisez,
Man, the Natural End of, 9 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 134-7 (1967).
19. See almost any neo-scholastic manual of moral theology; for a
brief survey and critique, see G. GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 12-
13, 103-06, 112 (1983).
20. Second Vatican Council, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH
IN THE MODERN WORLD (Gaudium et Spes), no. 39, reprinted in THE Docu-
MNTrs OF VATICAN 11 199, 237 (W. Abbott ed. 1965).
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sic human goods and first principles of practical reasoning,
modern legal theory has followed another path. It is the in-
heritor of the Enlightenment, which repudiated both the (ill-
conceived) heavenly last end, and the crystallized negative
moral principles prematurely declared by theologians and ra-
tionalist philosophers to be truly first principles of practical
reason. While Kant tried to resurrect the moral principles by
giving them the rational force of the principle of non-contra-
diction,"1 Bentham wanted to instrumentalize all principles,
virtues and social arrangements to the pursuit of an attaina-
ble worldly end: the maximum net pleasure, or minimum net
pain, of the maximum number of human beings.'2 Contem-
porary social theory rightly treats as absurd each of Ben-
tham's key notions: (i) that pleasure is the maximand, (ii) that
pain and pleasure are simply higher and lower points on a
single scale, and (iii) that sense can be made of an injunction
conjoining two superlatives, whether "the most words in the
shortest time" or "the greatest good of the greatest num-
ber"."8 Nothing of Bentham's project for guiding social
choice remains for serious consideration; it was not merely
impracticable, but radically incoherent and senseless, in many
different respects. Bentham himself was uneasily aware of
one further incoherence that I have not mentioned. He could
not decide whether his injunctions were offered to each indi-
vidual as guides to maximizing his own happiness, or rather
to an entire society (and thus to each of its members) as
guides to maximizing the happiness of "the greatest num-
ber".' He could not make up his mind in fifty years what his
recipe was a recipe for, a boiled egg or an omelet.
21. I. KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN 424 (1785;
Prussian Academy ed. vol. IV (1911)), trans. L.W. Beck (R. Wolff ed.),
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47-48 (1969). For a balanced
account of the place of non-contradiction in Kant's ethics, see K. WARD,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S VIEW OF ETHICS 99-130 (1972).
22. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 11 n. d (1789; note added in 1822; Burns and Hart eds.,
1970).
23. On the implausibility of pleasure as the point of everything, see
R. NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974); J. FINNIS, Supra note
1, at 95-96. For reasons why pain and pleasure are not to be treated as
points on a scale, see Grover, The Ranking Assumption, 4 THEORY AND DEcI-
SION 277-99 (1974). For the logical problems caused by conjoined superla-
tives, see P. GEACH, THE VIRTUES 91-94 (1977).
24. See, e.g., 9 J. BENTHAM, WORKS (J. Bowring ed. 1843). For a brief
account of the modern exegesis of Bentham on this problem, see H.L.A.
Hart's Introduction to J. BENTHAM, supra note 22, at xlix-lii.
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Perhaps the only successor to Bentham in contemporary
legal theory goes by the name of Economic Analysis of Law."5
For this school proposes as the criterion of just social choice
the aggregative maximization of the wealth of society. The
wealth of a society is in turn defined as the sum of all goods
and services in the society, weighted by their values, while
what one values is defined as what he is willing and able to
pay for, and the measure of that value is defined as how
much he is willing and able to pay. But this maximand,
wealth as thus defined, is quite implausible. It incompletely
represents the basic forms of human well-being and lacks any
account of the intrinsic relations between resources and those
basic goods. Moreover, the injunction to maximize wealth
without regard to either prior or resulting patterns of distri-
bution is even less plausible. Economic Analysis of Law, as a
normative theory, grotesquely lacks any account of the limits
on what is up for distribution (hearts of live donors? children
for torture? anybody for slavery?. . .). Equally lacking is a co-
herent account of why what counts as payment should be dis-
tinguished from duress, fraud or theft.
There remains a substantial body of theory seeking with
ertinacity and some success to explore the resources and
limits of instrumental rationality in the context of social life.
Game theory concerns individual decision-making in a social
context. Social choice theory focuses instead on decisions to be
made on behalf of a society, decisions to be chosen on the
basis of an aggregation of individual preferences. These two
branches of the theory of instrumental rationality are analo-
gous to the two projects between which Bentham could not
make up his mind.
The principal result of the vast and rigorous effort of so-
cial choice theory over the last forty years has become rather
well known under the label "Arrow's theorem":26 under any
non-arbitrary, fair, or non-perverse method of amalgamating
the preferences of individuals, instances of intransitive or cyc-
lical outcomes occur. Outcomes are intransitive or cyclical
when outcome A beats outcome B, and outcome B beats out-
25. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1981). In his
Preface to the 1983 edition, Judge Posner seems virtually to abandon any
claim that his normative theory is justified or correct, and points to the
"rather bizarre results that its unflinching application could produce."
26. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 51-9 (2d ed.
1963). For a simple exposition of the General Possibility Theorem in a con-
text of political theory, see W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 115-36
(1982).
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come C, but outcome C beats outcome A. In such a situation,
the amalgamation of individual preferences fails to provide a
rational, consistent or meaningful identification of the pre-
ferred "social choice." To Arrow's inconvenient theorem we
can add other assured results of social theory. There is, for
example, Elizabeth Anscombe's demonstration that even
when all issues are decided by majority vote, the majority of
voters can be in the minority on the majority of issues and
the person or persons directly affected by the vote can always
be in the minority. 7 Indeed, as William Riker has shown, for
any method of amalgamation which involves the summation
of revealed preferences (i.e. a system of voting), the possibil-
ity of strategic voting guarantees that, where more than two
possible outcomes were available for choice, we cannot know
whether the result of the amalgamation is meaningful or is
rather the result of manipulation of the voting process by the
strategic voting of perhaps a small minority. 8
The upshot of social choice theorizing is to this extent
clear. Legal theory must make its way in a world in which we
know that fair procedures cannot guarantee outcomes which
are fair in the sense of accurately representing, say, majority
preferences.
The problems of intransitivity which undermine the pro-
ject of aggregating individual preferences into a "social
choice" are, in fact, not restricted to social choice. In arriving
at his or her own determinate preferences, an individual
must choose, and in this choosing will encounter the same
paradoxes of intransitivity as have been demonstrated in the
context of social choice. Whenever one has several interests
or desires or standards of evaluation or criteria of choice, and
is choosing between more than two alternatives, one can find
that alternative A is preferable to B and C in respect of value
vI (say, having unpolluted river water), while alternative B is
preferable to C and A in respect of value v2 (say, minimiza-
tion of transaction costs), and alternative C is preferable to A
and B in respect of value v3 (say, likelihood of fair and uncor-
rupt administration). 9
27. Anscombe, On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfilment of the Major-
ity's Will in G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, 3 COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123-29
(1981). Anscombe is not, of course, a professed "social choice theorist."
28. W. RIKER, supra note 26. Note Arrow's remark that "in a genera-
lized sense all methods of social choice are of the type of voting." K. AR-
ROW, supra note 26, at 27-28.
29. See Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. Jutis. 21, 37-38(1978).
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This problem of intransitivity has serious consequences
for every form of utilitarianism, consequentialism or propor-
tionalism s° in ethics. But intransitivity also generates logically
necessary and severe limitations on the usefulness of social
choice theory's partner in the theory of instrumental ration-
ality: game theory.
Game theory offers to guide the choices of players, each
of whom knows his own interests or preferences, and the in-
terests or preferences of the other participants, and each of
whom seeks to maximize the satisfaction of his own interests
and preferences by choices made in circumstances where the
outcome for him will or may be affected by the choices of the
other participants but where the choices must be made in ig-
norance of the other participants' actual choices. Since the
theory predicts the outcomes for all players, its results are
considered guides to social decision-making, too. Some theo-
rists, like Hobbes, have thought to explain the point of legal
regulation in terms of one of the paradigm games in game
theory: the Prisoners' Dilemma.
This paradigm, like Hobbes's state of nature, posits a sit-
uation with two significant features: (i) the effort by each
player to maximize his gains, or to minimize his possible
losses, yields an equilibrium in which for each player the out-
come is much inferior to what each could have attained by
cooperation; (ii) all cooperative arrangements are radically
unstable because each has the incentive to renege on the ar-
rangement, both for the sake of further gain and for the
avoidance of very serious loss in the event of the other
player's reneging. 1 Many discussions of the Prisoners' Di-
lemma focus on the "paradoxical" character of the first fea-
ture. But legal theory has a special interest in the second. For
30. For the meaning of these three terms, see J. FINNIS, supra note 2,
at 80-86; see also note 44 infra, and text between note 44 and note 45.
31. The eponymous Prisoners' Dilemma concerns the pre-trial inter-
rogation of two (guilty) prisoners. Each is interrogated separately, and
knows the following: (a) if neither confesses they will each get a short sen-
tence; (b) if one confesses but the other doesn't, the one will be released
and the other will get a heavy sentence; and (c) if both confess each gets a
moderate sentence. On game-theoretical postulates, (a) would be higher
"equilibrium" but is unstable, and the actual outcome will be the lower but
stable equilibrium, (c). A standard exposition is D.H. LucE AND H. RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957). For an accessible presentation of
many problems sharing the generalized structure of the Prisoners' Di-
lemma, with particular reference to the relevance of norms in attaining the
higher equilibrium, see E. ULLMANN-MARGALrr, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS
18-73, especially 18-29 (1977).
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the introduction of enforceable norms requiring cooperation
could enable the players to reach the higher and, for each,
more desirable of the two equilibria, the one attained by sta-
ble cooperation. Yet on the postulates of game theory, each
player has only the following incentive: to support the intro-
duction of enforceable norms but then to break the equilib-
rium by deviating secretly from those norms.
The postulates of game theory in fact render unintel-
ligible any judgement by the players that the higher level equi-
librium is preferable to any alternative outcome just because it
is an outcome in which each is doing equally well and no one
is suffering very serious loss. Such a judgement is unreasona-
ble on the postulates of game theory because on those postu-
lates there is another outcome which is more in each player's
interests: the outcome in which he gains the highest possible
individual payoff by secretly deviating from the collaboration
equilibrium.
Expositions of game theory often skate over this problem
by labelling the units in the calculus "preferences" rather
than "units of self-interest.""2 But, as authoritative exponents
such as Arrow"3 and Sen" have indicated, in the real world
no one's preferences and choices need be determined by the
emaciated rationality of self-interest. Participants in the real
world may prefer fairness to a marginal or even to a substan-
tial increment in the advancement of their own interests; and
if each participant is willing to guide his choice by considera-
tions of fairness, the dilemma can be resolved and the higher
equilibrium attained. Players with a preference for a fair out-
come to the game do have the incentive to introduce laws or
other norms, not as a mere ruse for secret personal advance-
ment, but as a path to an equilibrium whose fundamental at-
tractiveness is a good uncountable in the calculus of game
theory: fairness in the playing and outcome of the game
itself.
Notice that the resolution of the dilemma is attained not
by substituting altruism for egoistic self-interest, but by two
factors in conjunction. First, the concern (fundamental to
game theory) to maximize one's own pre-established prefer-
ences is to be replaced by a concern for a fair and desirable
32. See, e.g., Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 Ox-
FORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 299 (1983).
33. ARROW, supra note 26, at 114-15.
34. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Eco-
nomic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. ArF. 317-44 (1977).
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outcome to the game. Second, there must be a procedure (in
rme theory usually given with the structure of the problem)
or coordinating the individual choices so as to attain the de-
sirable fair outcome. An altruistic desire to advance the inter-
ests of other persons is not generally an adequate substitute
for either of the two factors just mentioned. For there is a
game-theoretical Altruists' Dilemma, analogous to the Prison-
ers'. That is to say, there are situations in which the shared
preferences for increasing the other player's pay-off yields
(on game-theoretical postulates) an outcome worse for both
than the outcome yielded by selfish choices."5
John Rawls has pointed out how the Prisoners' Dilemma
is resolvable by mutual adherence to principles of fairness."
But his A Theory of Justice is the great monument to game the-
ory's emaciated conception of reasonableness. For the book's
absolutely fundamental strategy is to explain and justify fair-
ness by reference to what would be chosen by persons on pos-
tulates which are, in fact, the postulates of game theory: that
each of the choosers is out to maximize his own interests,
selfish or altruistic, and has no concern for the fate of the
other participants as such. Those postulates and certain condi-
tions of ignorance together constitute the model that Rawls
calls the Original Position. The central claim of his theory is
that the principles of "justice as fairness" are those that
would, in the Original Position, be unanimously chosen as
principles to regulate social life in the real world outside the
Original Position. The rational attraction of this argument is
that the conditions of ignorance in the Original Position do
indeed guarantee that the principles there selected would be
free from any taint of bias, and would thus be fair.
But this strategy has an irremediable weakness. It as-
sumes that a principle which would go unchosen in the Origi-
nal Position cannot be a fair principle. The assumption is gra-
tuitous; Rawls offers no defense of it (though he defends the
conclusions it entails). But a defense of the assumption is re-
quired. For there are many principles for ordering social life
that would not be selected by the self-interested persons in
35. See E. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 31, at 48n, citing Schel-
ling, Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Game Theory to the Analysis of Ethical
Systems in GAME THEORY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (I. Buchler & H. Nu-
tini ed. 1969). On the important difference between friendship in the class-
ical sense (amicitia, philia) and altruism (a concept invented in the nine-
teenth century, by Auguste Comte, with intent to supercede friendship),
see J. Fpmts, supra note 1, at 142-44, 158.
36. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 269 n. 9 (1971).
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the Original Position. Principles which give priority, for ex-
ample, to truth and beauty over error and trash, or which
give support to interpersonal fidelity over the whims of self-
interest, would go unchosen, as Rawls explains, because each
of those choosers, not knowing what beliefs and values they
will have in the world outside the Original Position, would be
afraid to disadvantage error or infidelity in case he might
turn out to be a person with beliefs deemed erroneous, or
one who prefers "liberation" to fidelity."' The Rawlsian the-
ory of fairness thus rests on nothing more adequate than an
appeal to individual "prudence", in the sense of cautious self-
interest. Once this has been identified as its basis, its very
claim to be a theory of fairness is seen to be unfounded.
Indeed, the entire construction of Rawlsian justice pro-
ceeds on the emaciated conception of practical reason, in
which there is no acknowledgement of the intelligible good,
the attractive beauty or worth for its own sake, of truth and
knowledge, friendship and authenticity, beauty, devotion,
skill and even fairness itself. The whole construction is a de-
vice for guaranteeing that each shall get what he wants
whatever that may be, so far as is consistent with every other
getting what he wants consistent with. . . and so on. Here we
have the characteristic modern modelling of practical life and
reason on techniques of making or getting what happens to
be wanted, rather than on the doing of, or participation in,
substantive human goods. The goods and the virtues are
carefully reconstructed or reinterpreted as in themselves neu-
tral instruments of self-protection and the advancement of
self-interest. To repeat: the concept of self-interest in these
emaciated theories of practical reason is not necessarily one
of selfishness. But it is a concept in which friendship or fair-
ness are not intrinsic intelligible goods to be cherished and
advanced for their own sake. Rather they have the status of
something which someone happens to want, but which others
perhaps just don't want, and which therefore have no struc-
tural role.
One might suppose that the other well-known game-the-
oretical paradigm, the Coordination Problem," could help
37. Id. at 207-09, 327-28.
38. See E. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 31, at 74-133. Confusion
has arisen because there is a game-theoretical model of "coordination
problem" and there is a conception going under the same name but uncon-
strained by the emaciated and instrumental rationality of game-theoretical
postulates. For the latter, see, e.g., J. RAZ, PRACTICAL RESON AND NORmS
64, 159 (1975); Ganz, The Normativity of Law and Its Coordinative Function,
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explain the human good of coordination and cooperation.
Several recent social theorists have tried to use this paradigm
as an explanatory model of law and legal system."9 But it will
not provide what we are seeking.
In the game-theoretical Coordination Problem, the play-
ers have a shared interest in some objective attainable only by
cooperation, but there are more than one incompatible alter-
native ways of coordinating their actions. The players wish,
for example, to meet, and they could meet at places P1, P2
or P3. In the purest version of the Coordination Problem,
the players are entirely indifferent as between the possible
meeting places (equilibria). In less pure instances of the para-
digm, player A most prefers P1, player B most prefers P2,
but each player regards all three places as acceptable and any
of them as preferable to not meeting at all. Clearly, some
rule of thumb, or legal rule like the rule of the road, or a
system of traffic lights, will enable the players to identify a
salient40 solution, say P2. The salient solution, once chosen, is
stable because preferred by all to the absence of a solution,
for all the players prefer meeting to missing (while in the
traffic situation all prefer missing to meeting).
Obviously, the game-theoretical Coordination Problem is
no adequate model for explaining the emergence and the fea-
ture of law. In the game-theoretical Coordination Problems,
once a solution is identified, there is no possibility of devia-
tion from it. The sole point of the game is that the players
shall "meet", and no player has any rational motive, whether
selfish or altruistic, for choosing an action which will disrupt
the equilibrium."" For the postulate of the game-theoretical
16 ISRAEL L. REV. 333 (1981); J. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 232-33, 244-49,
306. The note, id. at 255, implicitly distinguishes between the two concep-
tions, but ought to have done so much more explicitly. Failure to notice
the distinction renders irrelevant the critique in Green, supra note 32.
39. See Ganz, supra note 38; and the reply by Ullmann-Margalit, Is
Law a Co-ordinative Authority? 16 ISRAEL L. REV. 350 (1981).
40. "As Schelling and Lewis have shown, co-ordination problems are,
very generally, solved through salience: one of the co-ordination equilibria
might appear conspicuous to the people involved, owing to some specific
feature it possesses, and might hence serve as a focal point for the conver-
gence of their choice of actions. The salience of the co-ordination equilib-
rium need not be, and in general is not, a result of its being in any obvious
sense better than the other co-ordination equilibria .... Precedent and
agreement also solve recurrent co-ordination problems. They can, how-
ever, be viewed as special cases - albeit important ones - of salience." E.
ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 31, at 83-84 (original emphasis).
41. See Green, supra note 32, at 317, 319.
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Coordination Problem, as of other game-theoretical models,
is that each player can and does rank the possible outcomes
in a preference ranking which is complete and transitive4'
(and then seeks to do the best he can in terms to secure those
outcomes, as ranked). In the Coordination Problem, the al-
ternative to the chosen salient equilibrium rank higher on no
one's preference ranking, and since that ranking is presup-
posed to be complete and transitive, deviance would be not
so much wrong as irrational. Indeed, it would be so irrational
that deviation is not an intelligible choice."8
In the real life of practical reasonableness, alternatives
do not present themselves for choice in transitive orderings.
Choice A will be better than choice B in respect of its friend-
liness or fairness or of its increasing my long-run security, but
choice B will be better than choice A in respect of its increas-
ing my here-and-now satisfactions or short-run security.
These different types of goods are not commensurable apart
from particular scales of assessment which one chooses to em-
ploy. And the reasons for one's most fundamental choices of
scales of assessment cannot be that they identify quantities of
42. As is implied in my use of "intransitivity", in the text after note
28, a relationship R between choices or outcomes x, y, z. . . is transitive if
for all x, y, z . . ., xRy and yRz implies xRz.
43. This impossibility of deviance is the counter-part of the impossi-
bility of morally significant choice in the utilitarian, consequentialist or
proportionalist model of rational choice:
One can choose only what appears to one to be good; but if, as
proportionalists claim, (i) 'wrong' entails 'yielding (or promising)
less good', and (ii) [one is in a situation in .which some] choices can
be identified as yielding (or promising) less good than some alter-
native choice(s), then it becomes inconceivable that a morally
wrong (as distinct from a merely mistaken) choice could ever be
made [in that situation]. How could anyone choose an act which he
can see yields less good than some alternative open to him? Mor-
ally wrong choices are, of course, unreasonable. But unreasonable
choices are possible precisely because the goods apparently realiza-
ble by choices are not commensurable as yielding (or promising)
greater or lesser good; they retain their attractiveness as yielding
(or promising) some real good, an attractiveness which would be
destroyed if that could be seen to embody less good, all things
considered, than some available alternative. The unreasonableness
of morally wrong choices is not the incomprehensibility of choos-
ing a lesser good [i.e. a good that is simply lower on the (supposed)
one rational measure]. Rather it is the unreasonableness of pursu-
ing good arbitrarily, or unfairly, or fanatically, or inconstantly, or
by means of a direct attack on some basic good, or in some other
way contrary to a principle of practical reasonableness.
J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 89-90.
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the good to be assessed or even transitive ordinal relations be-
tween outcomes in terms only of that assessable good."
In short, the Coordination Problem model, as under-
stood in game theory, takes things too easily to be of assis-
tance in legal theory. By assuming that the players have com-
plete and transitive preference rankings, and that these
coincide to support the choice of a salient solution preferred
by each to no solution, the model shares the weakness I iden-
tified in Raz's denial that law is needed to secure morally de-
sirable schemes of cooperation. Within the confines of the
river pollution game, many players prefer no solution to any
of the salient solutions. The game of coordination in society
can only be played if it is extended to a field of choice which
is, in terms of time and subject matter, a wide field, so that
burdens in one part of the field can be envisaged as related to
benefits in others. But widening the field of choice has a fur-
ther result: all individual and social decision procedures will
yield conspicuous intransitivities. The resulting dilemmas can
be overcome, as they in practice are overcome, by acknowl-
edging a certain sort of good or "benefit", the good of fair-
ness and the related good of social or political friendship or
good neighborliness. These are goods which certainly multi-
ply the intransitivities. But they enable the individual to ac-
knowledge the moral authority of decision-procedures which
cannot pretend to maximize the satisfaction of his own or
others' preferences. There is, in short, an intelligent concern
for the structure and outcome of whole systems of personal
interactions which is not a concern either for maximized ag-
44. Thus Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, in their standard work
on game and decision theory, make the appropriate caveat about the axiom
of transitivity, the first and decisive axiom the theory:
No matter how intransitivities arise, we must recognize that they
exist, and we can take only little comfort in the thought that they
are an anathema to most of what constitutes theory in the behav-
ioral sciences today. We may say that we are only concerned with
behavior which is transitive, adding hopefully that we believe this
need not always be a vacuous study.
H.D. LUCE AND H. RAIFFA, supra note 31, at 25. The authors are aware,
too, that intransitivities often emerge because a subject (i.e. a topic or situa-
tion) "forces choices between inherently incomparable alternatives. The
idea is that each alternative invokes "responses" on several different 'attri-
bute' scales and that, although each scale may itself be transitive, their
amalgamation need not be." Id. at 25. On the reasonable choice of the
basic commitments in terms of which we can subsequently rank, transi-
tively, a good many alternatives, see J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 87-88, 90-
92; J. FINNIs, supra note 1, at 115-18.
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gregations of preferences or for maximizing one's own indi-
vidual payoffs (whether selfish or altruistic).
III
Law is one of the paradigms of political authority. Politi-
cal authority has its most thorough explanation as the source
of solutions to coordination problems. But now "coordina-
tion problems" must be understood without the restrictions
of game theory's postulates. The term now extends to any
situation where, if there were a coordination of action, signif-
icantly beneficial payoffs otherwise practically unattainable
would be attained by significant numbers of persons, where
there is sufficient shared interest to make some such coordi-
nation attractive, and where the problem is to select some ap-
propriate pattern of coordination in such a way that coordi-
nation will actually occur.
In a general theory of law, the principal object of con-
cern is the last-mentioned aspect of the problem. The focal
question is not: What is the right decision in such circum-
stances? (There is good reason, as we have seen, to think that
most often no uniquely correct solution could be found). The
focal question for legal theory is rather: How is action to be
coordinated? How, first, is a solution to be selected? Why,
once selected, is it to count as the solution? And then, what is
involved in maintaining it as the solution all through its
implementation?
In the final analysis, there are only two ways of coordi-
nating action in a group. There must be either unanimity or
authority. Whichever method is employed, it must handle
two distinguishable problems: (i) the selection of a pattern of
coordination, and (ii) the implementing of that pattern in ac-
tual cooperation to the degree required to attain desired ben-
efits. The selection may, for example, be by exchange of
promises, which requires unanimity between the promising
parties at the time of the promise. Or it may be by some leg-
islative body which in the extreme but possible case might
comprise every member of the community and make deci-
sions only by unanimity. But in either case, if the desired re-
sult is to be attained by cooperation, the unanimity about the
selected pattern must either continue all the way through the
period of implementation or must, during that period and for
its duration, be replaced by authority. Such authority may
take one or other of the following forms: either the authori-
tativeness of the selection process (promise or enactment)
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must be quasi-unanimously acknowledged, or some authorita-
tive person or body of persons must hold the parties to the
selected pattern.
The invocation of political authority to settle coordina-
tion problems can be illustrated by returning to the problem
of river pollution, the case used by Raz in denying the moral
authority of law. The problem arises because people, even
people of purest good will, can discern a variety of practical
possibilities. We can have:
SI: a river of really pure running water. The benefits
will be that it looks and smells good and so is apt for human
aesthetic enjoyment and play, that it sustains natural plants
and fish for conservation, science, or sport, that its waters are
drinkable without expensive processing and cause no infec-
tions or injuries. . . and many other potential payoffs. Alter-
natively, we can have:
S2: a river that is freely available as a sewer. The benefits
of such a regime will be that it allows producers to dispose of
their waste far more cheaply than by any available alternative
means, and saves the community the costs of policing the
river. Or we can have:
S3: a river that is available for unlimited waste disposal
by those willing to pay a waste-disposal fee to defray the costs
of alternative drinking water supplies and additional health
services, and perhaps to finance other public services whether
or not made necessary by the policy of permissive disposal.
The benefits of this will be some, but not all, of those availa-
ble under scheme S2, supplemented by additional payoffs to
taxpayers because the scheme provides an additional source
of public revenue. Or, finally (in a list that could in fact be
extended), we can have:
S4: a river that is available for limited waste disposal, the
quantity and quality of pollutants being policed so as to be
compatible with some plant and fish life, some aesthetic en-
joyment, a low level of infection, and other benefits like those
in scheme S1, but at a level lower than in S1 though at a
much higher level than in S2 or S3.
Obviously, each of these schemes (even, to a limited ex-
tent, the practice of unlimited waste disposal, S2), involves
coordination if it is to attain the payoffs envisaged. Each po-
tential solution involves a pattern of actions and abstentions
by a (large) number of agents and potential agents, such that
the benefits of any individual action or abstention depend on
the actions and abstentions of the other parties. Moreover,
selecting and moving to one scheme in preference to its pred-
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ecessor involves a more or less distinct "framework" coordi-
nation problem: How shall such questions of selection of
schemes be decided? For this river is only one of many, and
pollution of rivers is only one form of pollution, and pollu-
tion is only one of countless forms of socially relevant phe-
nomena involving costs and benefits, human goods and
harms.
There is a sense in which this "framework" coordination
problem is only ephemeral in character, at least by compari-
son with the day-in day-out character of coordinating the op-
eration of the selected scheme. Once the appropriate persons
have coordinated the processes of selection and the polity has
adopted the scheme, the framework problem seems to be
solved. But there is also a sense in which the framework
problem and its procedural solution subsist as standing fea-
tures of the polity. Those who participate in the life of the
polity must go on, day-in and day-out, acknowledging that
what was done by way of selecting a scheme did settle that
question not only for then but also for now. In other words,
the selection, whether it was by a process of custom-forma-
tion or by enactment, judgment or other authoritative de-
cree, must be treated as authoritative.
The necessity ("must") just mentioned is to be under-
stood as follows. Schemes SI, S3 and S4 do not yield their
payoffs unless the relevant population displays a high level of
conformity with the selected scheme. It may well be that 25
percent of the population favor SI, while 25 percent favor
S2, 25 percent S3, and 25 percent S4. What is certain is that
none of the schemes will yield any significant benefits if there
is only 25 percent compliance. The required level of compli-
ance is quasi-uniformity, a kind of unanimity in action. But
since there is no unanimity at all about the intrinsic desirabil-
ity of the respective schemes, such unanimity in action must
result from quasi-unanimity about the desirability of con-
forming to the authoritatively selected scheme. The uniform-
ity of action must result from quasi-unanimous acknowledge-
ment of the authority of that selection, of the process which
settled upon one scheme rather than the others.
The farmer confronting the anti-pollution policy con-
fronts concretely the essential questions about political and
legal authority. Why should he treat a law against river pollu-
tion as authoritative, while treating propaganda, appeals to
community spirit, and developed or developing practice as of
no consequence? And what is his "shared interest" in a
scheme which he thinks is mistaken, and which he knows may
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be damaging to him?
The answer to the first question lies in the quality of the
legal system as a device for solving coordination problems.
The quality of a legal system that makes it authoritative is its
general salience. By holding itself out as a public and privi-
leged identification of a solution for the case of every coordi-
nation problem, and by offering grounds for acknowledging
that privileged status, the law achieves the salience it seeks in
particular coordination problems. The grounds for acknow-
ledging that privileged status are several. The law, if ac-
corded that status, offers the prospect of combining speed
with clarity in generating practical solutions to constantly
emerging and changing coordination problems, and in sug-
gesting devices by which such solutions can be generated. Its
institutions for devising and maintaining solutions secure fair-
ness by the stability, the practicability and the generality or
non-discriminatory character of the solutions, and by the im-
position of those solutions on free-riders and other deviants
by processes which minimize arbitrariness and self-interested
or partisan deviance in the very processes themselves. In
short, it is the values of the Rule of Law "' that give the legal
system its distinctive entitlement to be treated as the source
of authoritative solutions.
These valuable features of a legal system are important
precisely because, in the real world, recalcitrance is always
possible, even on the part of one for whom cooperation
would bring benefits. The variety and complexity of basic
human goods, and of reasonable ways of pursuing and realiz-
ing human good, make actual "preferences" radically unsta-
ble. For "payoffs" are ambivalent and "orderings" always re-
main incomplete and actually or potentially intransitive.
Friendship, and fairness, are amongst the causes of that am-
bivalence, intransitivity and instability; they are interests and
goods that unsettle any individual preference-ranking by de-
manding, attractively, the sacrifice of some of one's "own"
goods and interests for the sake of a shared interest.
There remains the question whether and how the farmer
has a shared interest in complying with the anti-pollution law.
There is a shared interest, or sharing of aim, which makes a
community possible and lasting despite lack of consensus on
almost every practical problem. This sharing of aim has as its
45. On the Rule of Law, see J. RAz, supra note 3, at 210-29; J. FIN-
NIS, supra note 1, at 270-76, 292-93. Both these treatments profited greatly
from L. FULLER, THE MOALrrv OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
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most directly significant component the shared willingness to
treat friendship and fairness for what they are: aspects of
human flourishing which provide a counter-attraction to, and
critique of, many alternative, vividly attractive, but diminished
conceptions of that well-being. Concretely, then, the farmer
can judge that the regular, impartial maintenance of the legal
order itself is a good which gives him sufficient shared inter-
est in, and reason for, cooperation by compliance with the
anti-pollution law. The good he thus discerns and seeks to
realize is a good indiscernible in the emaciated models of
practical reasonableness: the good of a fair method of relat-
ing burdens to benefits, and persons to persons, over an im-
mensely complex and lasting but shifting set of persons and
their aspirations and transactions. Nothing other than legal
order can promise such a method.

